Competizione in mercati regolati: recenti sviluppi teorici

Gianni De Fraja
University of York e CEPR, Londra

ABSTRACT
This paper is a survey of recent models of competition in regulated markets. We begin by introducing the basic Laffont and Tirole [25] model. This basic model applies to a two person situation: a regulator and a firm. We then show how the model extends to a variety of situations where more than two agents, with different objective functions interact: the regulated firm can be in competition with other firms, the right to be the regulated firm is assigned through an auction, the regulated firm is threatened by potential entrants, or is in a situation where it may be the sole supplier of an input essential for its competitors' production. We end with consideration of the role of conflict of interest within the firm, between shareholders and manager [Cod. JEL: L51, D82].