Competizione in mercati regolati: recenti sviluppi
Gianni De Fraja
University of York e CEPR, Londra
This paper is a survey of recent models of competition in regulated
markets. We begin by introducing the basic Laffont and Tirole 
model. This basic model applies to a two person situation: a regulator
and a firm. We then show how the model extends to a variety of situations
where more than two agents, with different objective functions interact:
the regulated firm can be in competition with other firms, the right
to be the regulated firm is assigned through an auction, the regulated
firm is threatened by potential entrants, or is in a situation where
it may be the sole supplier of an input essential for its competitors'
production. We end with consideration of the role of conflict of
interest within the firm, between shareholders and manager [Cod.
JEL: L51, D82].