In this paper we analyse a multidimensional auction where quality scores are private information of the Public Administration (PA). We introduce a multistage procedure: in the first stage every participant submits a technical proposal, without knowing what the buyer evaluation is. In the second stage every bidder proposes a price. We investigate the best strategic use of the PA's information comparing three different policies: a) secrecy b) private revelation c) public revelation. We show that only the second one is able to achieve allocative efficiency. At the same time, generally, this strategy is associated with a lower PA's expected utility. [JEL Classification: H57, D44, D82]

*nicola.doni@unifi.it

This research was supported by Italian Ministry of University under PRIN project “Public services and infrastructures: regulatory, financial and institutional problems”. The Author wishes to thank P.A. Mori, D. Menicucci and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies.