CALL FOR PAPERS

**FIRMS’ OBJECTIVES AND INTERNAL ORGANIZATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS**

Submission Due Date: June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2007

Guest Editor: 
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A longstanding issue in industrial economics and the theory of the firm is whether profits can be considered as the main (or sole) goal of a firm operating in a market economy. In fact, large streams of literature, at different points during the developments of the modern theory of industrial organization, have successfully illustrated several alternative objectives such as the maximization of revenues, growth rates, value added per worker, and a mix of profits and sales.

These alternatives were considered, in turn, to investigate the strategies of either managerial or labour-managed firms (or workers’ enterprises, in the jargon of Sertel and Aoki). That is to say, taking into consideration objective functions other than profits amounted to analysing firm’s structure differing from the classic entrepreneurial (pure profit-seeking) unit.

The large amount of literature on this matter notwithstanding, many relevant aspects, both positive and normative, remain to address. This is particularly relevant after more than a decade of globalization, whereby firms with heterogeneous histories, internal structures and goals have found themselves competing in a global market lacking, in general, harmonised rules. Some relevant questions that remain still open are, for example: what is the impact of the separation between ownership and control or value-added maximization on the structure of vertical relations and the related incentive toward vertical integration vs outsourcing? How firms with different objectives perform in a globalised economy where outsourcing involves strategic R&D activities and inputs? What is the interplay between outsourcing, trade and trade policy in a globalised economy where firms with different objectives coexist? Is there a relationship between firms’ internal structure, goals and dimension on one side and economic growth on the other? Is it possible (or even likely) that boosting strategic delegation is used as an instrument to bypass trade barriers in integrated markets with intraindustry trade?

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS:**

Some research topics that contributors to the special issues might address are one or more of the following:

1) strategic interaction 
2) implicit/explicit collusion 
3) horizontal mergers 
4) vertical integration vs outsourcing 
5) international trade and trade policy
6) entry and barriers to entry
7) R&D incentives and policy
8) capital accumulation and growth

in oligopoly markets supplied by profit-seeking, managerial and labour-managed firms or a mix thereof. Theoretical, policy-oriented and empirical papers are equally welcome.

SUBMISSION AND REVIEW PROCESS:

Electronic submissions of the papers, in English, must be made to the Editor (lamberti@spbo.unibo.it) and in copy to the Rivista di Politica Economica (rpe@confindustria.it) within June 1st, 2007.
The papers accepted for publication in the Rivista di Politica Economica will also be published in a Palgrave Macmillan book in its Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy Series.

TENTATIVE TIME LINE:

June 1st, 2007 Deadline for electronic submission of papers to the special issue
July 31st, 2007 Notification to authors regarding acceptance to the Special Issue, which may be conditional on completing the revisions indicated in the referees’ reports.
December 31st 2007 Delivery of the revised submission to the Guest Editor and to the Rivista di Politica Economica

FURTHER INFORMATION:

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